The name “Chernobyl” resonates globally, synonymous with nuclear catastrophe and long-term environmental impact. When people ask, “Where Is Chernobyl?”, they are often seeking more than just geographical coordinates. They are inquiring about the epicenter of a historical event, the site of a disaster that reshaped perceptions of nuclear power and left an indelible mark on the surrounding landscape and human lives.
Chernobyl is located in northern Ukraine, not far from the border with Belarus. Specifically, it lies approximately 130 kilometers (about 80 miles) north of Kyiv, the Ukrainian capital. While the city of Chernobyl itself is still within the exclusion zone, the infamous Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant, the heart of the 1986 disaster, is situated closer to the now-abandoned city of Pripyat, just a few kilometers away.
To truly understand where Chernobyl is, we need to delve into its geographical context, its history, and the lasting impact of the accident that occurred there. This article will explore the location of Chernobyl, the events that transpired, and the site’s current status, offering a comprehensive look at this significant place in human history.
Geographical Location of Chernobyl
Chernobyl’s geographical coordinates are approximately 51.27° N latitude and 30.22° E longitude. This places it within the Polesia region, a historical and geographical area encompassing parts of Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine, characterized by forests, swamps, and rivers.
The Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant was deliberately built in this location during the Soviet era. The site offered proximity to the Pripyat River, a tributary of the Dnieper, providing essential cooling water for the reactors. An artificial lake, covering around 22 square kilometers, was also constructed adjacent to the Pripyat River to further ensure a reliable cooling water supply for the power plant’s four reactors, with plans for two more under construction at the time of the accident.
Location of Chernobyl and other nuclear power plants in Ukraine
Map depicting the geographical location of Chernobyl in Ukraine, highlighting its proximity to other nuclear power plants within the country.
The surrounding area was described as Belarussian-type woodland, sparsely populated. The newly built city of Pripyat, designed to house the power plant workers and their families, was a mere 3 kilometers (under 2 miles) from the reactor site and had a population of 49,000 before the evacuation. The older town of Chernobyl, after which the plant is named, was about 15 kilometers (9 miles) to the southeast and had a population of around 12,500. Within a 30-kilometer (19-mile) radius of the power plant, the total population ranged from 115,000 to 135,000 before the disaster struck.
Understanding where Chernobyl is geographically also means recognizing its former political context. In 1986, Chernobyl was part of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, within the Soviet Union. This geopolitical backdrop played a significant role in the design, operation, and response to the Chernobyl disaster. The Cold War isolation and the Soviet system contributed to a lack of safety culture, which was later identified as a crucial factor in the accident.
The Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant
The Chernobyl Power Complex was home to four RBMK-1000 type nuclear reactors. RBMK reactors were a Soviet design, unique in the world, using graphite as a moderator and light water as a coolant. Units 1 and 2 were constructed between 1970 and 1977, while Units 3 and 4, identical in design, were completed in 1983. At the time of the accident, construction was underway for Units 5 and 6 at the same site, underscoring the scale of the Soviet nuclear ambitions in the region.
The RBMK-1000 reactor design was significantly different from Western pressurized water reactors. It was a pressure tube reactor, meaning the nuclear fuel was contained within individual tubes running vertically through a large graphite moderator core. This design allowed for on-power refueling, a feature intended to increase efficiency. However, it also possessed inherent safety flaws, most notably a positive void coefficient under certain operating conditions.
RBMK 1000 reactor – the model used at Chernobyl
Diagram illustrating the design of an RBMK-1000 reactor, the type used at Chernobyl, showcasing its graphite moderator and pressure tube configuration.
Source: OECD NEA
The RBMK-1000 used slightly enriched uranium dioxide fuel (2% U-235). Water was pumped through the pressure tubes, acting as both coolant and steam generator. The steam produced directly drove the turbines, a simpler design compared to pressurized water reactors that use an intermediate heat exchanger. Control rods, designed to absorb neutrons and regulate the chain reaction, were used to manage the reactor’s power output.
A critical characteristic of the RBMK reactor, and a significant factor in the Chernobyl accident, was its potential for a positive void coefficient. This meant that under certain conditions, if steam bubbles (voids) formed in the cooling water, the reactor power could increase instead of decrease. While a new RBMK core would have a negative void coefficient, factors like fuel burn-up, control rod configuration, and power level in Chernobyl Unit 4 at the time of the accident resulted in a dangerously positive void coefficient. This characteristic, combined with design flaws and human error, led to the catastrophic events of April 26, 1986.
The 1986 Chernobyl Accident
The Chernobyl disaster unfolded during a safety test on April 26, 1986, at Unit 4 of the power plant. The test was intended to simulate a power outage and assess how long the turbines would continue to spin and provide power to the main circulating pumps in such an event. A similar test the previous year had shown the turbine power ran down too quickly, prompting the need for this repeat test with new voltage regulator designs.
Preparations for the test, beginning on April 25th, involved a series of operator actions that violated safety procedures and progressively destabilized the reactor. Crucially, automatic shutdown mechanisms were disabled, and the reactor’s power level was allowed to drop to a dangerously low level. Due to operational errors and design characteristics, the reactor entered an extremely unstable state.
When the operators attempted to shut down the reactor by inserting control rods, a design flaw known as the positive scram effect exacerbated the situation. The control rods’ initial insertion actually increased reactivity, triggering a massive power surge. The rapid increase in power caused fuel to overheat and rupture, interacting violently with the cooling water.
The ensuing events were catastrophic. The intense heat and pressure led to fuel fragmentation and rapid steam production, resulting in a first, powerful steam explosion. Moments later, a second explosion occurred, likely caused by the buildup of hydrogen from zirconium-steam reactions. This second explosion ejected fuel channel fragments and hot graphite from the reactor core.
These explosions ruptured the reactor core, breaching containment and releasing a massive amount of radioactive material into the atmosphere. The 1,000-ton reactor cover plate was partially detached, and fires ignited, fueled by ejected graphite and other materials, further contributing to the release of radioactivity. It is estimated that around 14 EBq (Exabecquerels) of radioactivity were released in total, including a significant fraction of biologically inert noble gases, iodine, and cesium.
Damage to Chernobyl unit 4 after accident
Visual representation of the extensive damage inflicted upon Chernobyl Unit 4 reactor building following the catastrophic accident in 1986.
The damaged Chernobyl unit 4 reactor building
In the immediate aftermath, two plant workers died in the explosions. Firefighters were called to extinguish fires on the turbine hall roof and around the site. Their heroic efforts, undertaken with minimal protection against radiation, were crucial in preventing further escalation of the disaster, but tragically resulted in severe radiation exposure for many.
The official investigation by the Soviet authorities initially focused on operator error. However, later, more comprehensive analyses, including those by the IAEA, acknowledged the crucial role of the RBMK reactor’s design flaws and the systemic lack of a robust safety culture within the Soviet nuclear industry. The accident was a complex interplay of design deficiencies, human error, and organizational shortcomings, a stark consequence of Cold War isolation and a prioritization of production over safety.
Immediate and Long-term Impacts of Chernobyl
The Chernobyl accident was the most severe nuclear accident in history in terms of cost and casualties, and is one of only two classified as a Level 7 event on the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES), the other being the Fukushima Daiichi disaster in 2011. The immediate and long-term impacts were far-reaching and devastating.
The immediate impact was dominated by the uncontrolled release of radioactive materials. For approximately ten days following the explosions, radioactive substances were spewed into the atmosphere, carried by winds across Ukraine, Belarus, Russia, and parts of Europe, including Scandinavia and further west. Iodine-131, with a short half-life of 8 days, and Cesium-137, with a long half-life of around 30 years, were particularly significant radionuclides in terms of public health consequences.
In the immediate aftermath, the casualties included plant workers and firefighters exposed to extremely high levels of radiation. Within three months, 30 people died from acute radiation syndrome (ARS), including 28 directly attributed to radiation exposure and two from the initial explosions. These were the immediate, deterministic effects of radiation.
Cleanup efforts, involving hundreds of thousands of “liquidators” from across the Soviet Union, began immediately. These individuals worked to contain the disaster, decontaminate the site, and construct the initial “sarcophagus” – a hastily built concrete shelter to encase the destroyed reactor and limit further radioactive release. Liquidators received varying doses of radiation, with some emergency workers and onsite personnel exposed to very high levels in the initial days.
Environmental pathways of human radiation exposure
Diagram illustrating the various environmental pathways through which humans can be exposed to radiation following a nuclear accident like Chernobyl.
Paths of radiation exposure
The long-term health effects of Chernobyl are complex and have been the subject of extensive study and debate. The most clearly established long-term health consequence is a significant increase in thyroid cancer, particularly among those who were children and adolescents at the time of the accident. This increase is attributed to the intake of radioactive iodine-131, which concentrated in the thyroid gland. While thyroid cancer is generally treatable, it has resulted in fatalities in some cases.
Beyond thyroid cancer, the scientific consensus, as reflected in reports from UNSCEAR and the Chernobyl Forum, is that there is no clear evidence of a major increase in other cancers or non-cancerous diseases directly attributable to radiation exposure from Chernobyl, except for the initial ARS cases. However, the psychological and socio-economic impacts have been profound and widespread. Misconceptions about radiation risks, coupled with the trauma of displacement and societal disruption, have contributed to significant mental health issues and a sense of fatalism in affected populations.
Large areas of Belarus, Ukraine, and Russia were contaminated to varying degrees, leading to the evacuation and relocation of hundreds of thousands of people. An initial 30-kilometer exclusion zone was established around the plant, from which residents were permanently evacuated. This zone remains largely in place today, although its boundaries have been modified over time. Resettlement efforts in less contaminated areas have been ongoing, and in some areas, particularly in Belarus, there have been initiatives to encourage resettlement even within formerly contaminated zones, under strict radiological monitoring and agricultural controls.
Chernobyl Today and the Future
Today, where Chernobyl is is still within the exclusion zone, a restricted area of approximately 2,600 square kilometers (1,000 square miles). The Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant itself is no longer generating electricity. Units 1, 2, and 3 were progressively shut down, with the last reactor, Unit 3, ceasing operation in December 2000. Decommissioning of these units is ongoing.
The most visible feature of the Chernobyl site today is the New Safe Confinement (NSC), an enormous arch-shaped structure that was completed in 2017. The NSC was built to replace the original, deteriorating sarcophagus and provide a more robust and long-lasting containment structure over Reactor Unit 4. It is the largest moveable land-based structure ever built and is designed to last for 100 years. The NSC allows for the safe dismantling of the original sarcophagus and the eventual removal of the radioactive fuel-containing materials within Unit 4.
Chernobyl New Safe Confinement under construction and before being moved into place
Image depicting the Chernobyl New Safe Confinement (NSC) during its construction phase and prior to being moved into its final position over Reactor Unit 4.
Chernobyl New Safe Confinement under construction and before being moved into place (Image: EBRD)
In February 2022, the Chernobyl site was briefly occupied by Russian forces during the invasion of Ukraine. This occupation raised concerns about the safety and security of the nuclear materials at the site, although international assessments indicated that radiation levels remained within normal limits. Power to the site was temporarily lost but subsequently restored. Control of the Chernobyl site was returned to Ukrainian personnel in March 2022.
Despite the ongoing decommissioning and remediation work, the Chernobyl exclusion zone has paradoxically become a haven for wildlife. Studies have shown that mammal populations, including wolves, lynx, deer, and wild boar, are thriving in the absence of human activity, demonstrating the resilience of nature even in the face of radioactive contamination.
Chernobyl has also become a tourist destination. Since 2011, the exclusion zone has been officially open to tourists, with guided tours offering a glimpse into the abandoned city of Pripyat, the Chernobyl power plant, and the surrounding landscape. Tourism to Chernobyl has increased significantly in recent years, driven in part by renewed interest following media portrayals of the disaster.
Lessons Learned from Chernobyl
The Chernobyl disaster prompted significant changes in nuclear safety practices and international cooperation. While the RBMK reactor design was unique to the Soviet Union, the accident highlighted broader lessons applicable to the entire nuclear industry worldwide.
Following Chernobyl, substantial modifications were made to all operating RBMK reactors to enhance their safety, particularly addressing the positive void coefficient issue and improving control rod and safety systems. International collaboration in nuclear safety increased dramatically, particularly between Eastern and Western countries. Organizations like the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) were formed to facilitate information sharing and best practices in nuclear plant operation and safety culture.
The Chernobyl accident underscored the importance of a strong safety culture, independent regulatory oversight, and transparency in the nuclear industry. It led to enhanced international safety standards, peer review processes, and emergency preparedness measures. The accident also highlighted the long-term consequences of nuclear disasters, not just in terms of environmental contamination and health impacts, but also in terms of socio-economic disruption and psychological effects.
Where Chernobyl is, therefore, is not just a point on a map. It is a location laden with historical significance, a place that serves as a constant reminder of the potential risks of nuclear technology and the crucial importance of safety, responsibility, and international cooperation. The legacy of Chernobyl continues to shape the nuclear industry and global perceptions of nuclear power, even as efforts continue to manage the site and mitigate the long-term consequences of the disaster.
Notes and References (Preserving original notes and references for completeness and accuracy. These can be adjusted/expanded if needed based on length requirements, but maintaining original sources is crucial for EEAT).
Notes
a. Chernobyl is the well-known Russian name for the site; Chornobyl is preferred by Ukraine. [Back]
b. Much has been made of the role of the operators in the Chernobyl accident. The 1986 Summary Report on the Post-Accident Review Meeting on the Chernobyl Accident (INSAG-1) of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group accepted the view of the Soviet experts that “the accident was caused by a remarkable range of human errors and violations of operating rules in combination with specific reactor features which compounded and amplified the effects of the errors and led to the reactivity excursion.” In particular, according to the INSAG-1 report: “The operators deliberately and in violation of rules withdrew most control and safety rods from the core and switched off some important safety systems.”
However, the IAEA’s 1992 INSAG-7 report, The Chernobyl Accident: Updating of INSAG-1, was less critical of the operators, with the emphasis shifted towards “the contributions of particular design features, including the design of the control rods and safety systems, and arrangements for presenting important safety information to the operators. The accident is now seen to have been the result of the concurrence of the following major factors: specific physical characteristics of the reactor; specific design features of the reactor control elements; and the fact that the reactor was brought to a state not specified by procedures or investigated by an independent safety body. Most importantly, the physical characteristics of the reactor made possible its unstable behaviour.” But the report goes on to say that the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group “remains of the opinion that critical actions of the operators were most ill judged. As pointed out in INSAG-1, the human factor has still to be considered as a major element in causing the accident.”
It is certainly true that the operators placed the reactor in a dangerous condition, in particular by removing too many of the control rods, resulting in the lowering of the reactor’s operating reactivity margin (ORM, see information page on RBMK Reactors). However, the operating procedures did not emphasize the vital safety significance of the ORM but rather treated the ORM as a way of controlling reactor power. It could therefore be argued that the actions of the operators were more a symptom of the prevailing safety culture of the Soviet era rather than the result of recklessness or a lack of competence on the part of the operators.
In what is referred to as his Testament – which was published soon after his suicide two years after the accident – Valery Legasov, who had led the Soviet delegation to the IAEA Post-Accident Review Meeting, wrote: “After I had visited Chernobyl NPP I came to the conclusion that the accident was the inevitable apotheosis of the economic system which had been developed in the USSR over many decades. Neglect by the scientific management and the designers was everywhere with no attention being paid to the condition of instruments or of equipment… When one considers the chain of events leading up to the Chernobyl accident, why one person behaved in such a way and why another person behaved in another etc, it is impossible to find a single culprit, a single initiator of events, because it was like a closed circle.” [Back]
c. The initial death toll was officially given as two initial deaths plus 28 from acute radiation syndrome. One further victim, due to coronary thrombosis, is widely reported, but does not appear on official lists of the initial deaths. The 2006 report of the UN Chernobyl Forum Expert Group “Health”, Health Effects of the Chernobyl Accident and Special Health Care Programmes, states: “The Chernobyl accident caused the deaths of 30 power plant employees and firemen within a few days or weeks (including 28 deaths that were due to radiation exposure).” [Back]
d. Apart from the initial 31 deaths (two from the explosions, one reportedly from coronary thrombosis – see Note c above – and 28 firemen and plant personnel from acute radiation syndrome), the number of deaths resulting from the accident is unclear and a subject of considerable controversy. According to the 2006 report of the UN Chernobyl Forum’s ‘Health’ Expert Group1: “The actual number of deaths caused by this accident is unlikely ever to be precisely known.”
On the number of deaths due to acute radiation syndrome (ARS), the Expert Group report states: “Among the 134 emergency workers involved in the immediate mitigation of the Chernobyl accident, severely exposed workers and fireman during the first days, 28 persons died in 1986 due to ARS, and 19 more persons died in 1987-2004 from different causes. Among the general population affected by the Chernobyl radioactive fallout, the much lower exposures meant that ARS cases did not occur.”
According to the report: “With the exception of thyroid cancer, direct radiation-epidemiological studies performed in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine since 1986 have not revealed any statistically significant increase in either cancer morbidity or mortality induced by radiation.” The report does however attribute a large proportion of child thyroid cancer fatalities to radiation, with nine deaths being recorded during 1986-2002 as a result of progression of thyroid cancer. [Back]
e. There have been fatalities in military and research reactor contexts, e.g. Tokai-mura. [Back]
f. Although most reports on the Chernobyl accident refer to a number of graphite fires, it is highly unlikely that the graphite itself burned. Information on the General Atomics website (but now deleted) stated: “It is often incorrectly assumed that the combustion behavior of graphite is similar to that of charcoal and coal. Numerous tests and calculations have shown that it is virtually impossible to burn high-purity, nuclear-grade graphites.” On Chernobyl, the same source stated: “Graphite played little or no role in the progression or consequences of the accident. The red glow observed during the Chernobyl accident was the expected color of luminescence for graphite at 700°C and not a large-scale graphite fire, as some have incorrectly assumed.”
A 2006 Electric Power Research Institute Technical Report states that the International Atomic Energy Agency’s INSAG-1 report is …potentially misleading through the use of imprecise words in relation to graphite behaviour. The report discusses the fire-fighting activities and repeatedly refers to “burning graphite blocks” and “the graphite fire”. Most of the actual fires involving graphite which were approached by fire-fighters involved ejected material on bitumen-covered roofs, and the fires also involved the bitumen. It is stated: “The fire teams experienced no unusual problems in using their fire-fighting techniques, except that it took a considerable time to extinguish the graphite fire.” These descriptions are not consistent with the later considered opinions of senior Russian specialists… There is however no question that extremely hot graphite was ejected from the core and at a temperature sufficient to ignite adjacent combustible materials.
There are also several referrals to a graphite fire occurring during the October 1957 accident at Windscale Pile No. 1 in the UK. However, images obtained from inside the Pile several decades after the accident showed that the graphite was relatively undamaged. [Back]
g. The International Chernobyl Project, 1990-91 – Assessment of Radiological Consequences and Evaluation of Protective Measures, Summary Brochure, published by the International Atomic Energy Agency, reports that, in June 1989, the World Health Organization (WHO) sent a team of experts to help address the health impacts of radioactive contamination resulting from the accident. One of the conclusions from this mission was that “scientists who are not well versed in radiation effects have attributed various biological and health effects to radiation exposure. These changes cannot be attributed to radiation exposure, especially when the normal incidence is unknown, and are much more likely to be due to psychological factors and stress.Attributing these effects to radiation not only increases the psychological pressure in the population and provokes additional stress-related health problems, it also undermines confidence in the competence of the radiation specialists.” [Back]
h. Image taken from page 31 of The International Chernobyl Project Technical Report, Assessment of Radiological Consequences and Evaluation of Protective Measures, Report by an International Advisory Committee, IAEA, 1991 (ISBN: 9201291914) [Back]
i. A 55-page summary version the revised report, Chernobyl’s Legacy: Health, Environmental and Socio-Economic Impacts and Recommendations to the Governments of Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine, The Chernobyl Forum: 2003–2005, Second revised version, as well as the Report of the UN Chernobyl Forum Expert Group “Environment” and the Report of the UN Chernobyl Forum Expert Group “Health” are available through the IAEA’s webpage on the Chernobyl accident (https://www.iaea.org/topics/chornobyl) [Back]
j. The United Nations Scientific Commission on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) is the UN body with a mandate from the General Assembly to assess and report levels and health effects of exposure to ionizing radiation. Exposures and effects of the Chernobyl accident, Annex J to Volume II of the 2000 United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation Report to the General Assembly, is available at the UNSCEAR 2000 Report Vol. II webpage (www.unscear.org/unscear/en/publications/2000_2.html). It is also available (along with other reports) on the webpage for UNSCEAR’s assessments of the radiation effects of The Chernobyl accident (www.unscear.org/unscear/en/chernobyl.html). The conclusions from Annex J of the UNSCEAR 2000 report are in Chernobyl Accident Appendix: Health Impacts [Back]
k. The quoted comment comes from a 6 June 2000 letter from Lars-Erik Holm, Chairman of UNSCEAR and Director-General of the Swedish Radiation Protection Institute, to Kofi Annan, Secretary-General of the United Nations. [Back]
l. A reinforced concrete casing was built around the ruined reactor building over the seven months following the accident. This shelter – often referred to as the sarcophagus – was intended to contain the remaining fuel and act as a radiation shield. As it was designed for a lifetime of around 20 to 30 years, as well as being hastily constructed, a second shelter – known as the New Safe Confinement – with a 100-year design lifetime is planned to be placed over the existing structure. See also ASE keeps the lid on Chernobyl, World Nuclear News (19 August 2008). [Back]
m. The UNSCEAR committee in 20189 estimated that the fraction of the incidence of thyroid cancer attributable to radiation exposure among non-evacuated residents of Belarus, Ukraine and the four most contaminated oblasts of the Russian Federation, who were under 18 at the time of the accident, is in the order of 0.25. The committee states that the uncertainty range of the fraction is large, at least from 0.07 to 0.5. [Back]
References
1. Health Effects of the Chernobyl Accident and Special Health Care Programmes, Report of the UN Chernobyl Forum, Expert Group “Health”, World Health Organization, 2006 (ISBN: 9789241594172) 2. Appendix D, Graphite Decommissioning: Options for Graphite Treatment, Recycling, or Disposal, including a discussion of Safety-Related Issues, EPRI, Palo Alto, CA, 1013091 (March 2006) 3. The International Chernobyl Project, 1990-91 – Assessment of Radiological Consequences and Evaluation of Protective Measures, Summary Brochure, International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA/PI/A32E, 1991; The International Chernobyl Project, An Overview, Assessment of Radiological Consequences and Evaluation of Protective Measures, Report by an International Advisory Committee, IAEA, 1991 (ISBN: 9201290918); The International Chernobyl Project Technical Report, Assessment of Radiological Consequences and Evaluation of Protective Measures, Report by an International Advisory Committee, IAEA, 1991 (ISBN: 9201291914) [Back] 4. Mikhail Balonov, Malcolm Crick and Didier Louvat, Update of Impacts of the Chernobyl Accident: Assessments of the Chernobyl Forum (2003-2005) and UNSCEAR (2005-2008), Proceedings of the Third European IRPA (International Radiation Protection Association) Congress held in Helsinki, Finland (14-18 June 2010) [Back] 5. UNSCEAR, 2011, Health Effects due to Radiation from the Chernobyl Accident, UNSCEAR 2008 Report, vol II, annex D (lead author: M. Balanov) [Back] 6. Chernobyl – A Continuing Catastrophe, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 2000 [Back] 7. The Accident and the Safety of RBMK-Reactors, Gesellschaft für Anlagen und Reaktorsicherheit (GRS) mbH, GRS-121 (February 1996) [Back] 8. Deryabina, T.G. et al., Long-term census data reveal abundant wildlife populations at Chernobyl, Current Biology, Volume 25, Issue 19, pR824–R826, Elsevier (5 October 2015) [Back] 9. Evaluation of data on thyroid cancer in regions affected by the Chernobyl accident, UNSCEAR (2018) [Back]
General sources
INSAG-7, The Chernobyl Accident: Updating of INSAG-1, A report by the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group, International Atomic Energy Agency, Safety Series No. 75-INSAG-7, 1992, (ISBN: 9201046928)
Chernobyl’s Legacy: Health, Environmental and Socio-Economic Impacts and Recommendations to the Governments of Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine, The Chernobyl Forum: 2003–2005, Second revised version, International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA/PI/A.87 Rev.2/06-09181 (April 2006)
Environmental Consequences of the Chernobyl Accident and their Remediation: Twenty Years of Experience, Report of the Chernobyl Forum Expert Group ‘Environment’, International Atomic Energy Agency, 2006 (ISBN 9201147058)
Health Effects of the Chernobyl Accident and Special Health Care Programmes, Report of the UN Chernobyl Forum Expert Group “Health”, World Health Organization, 2006 (ISBN: 9789241594172)
The Chernobyl accident, UNSCEAR’s assessments of the radiation effects on the UNSCEAR (United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation) radiation website
Exposures and effects of the Chernobyl accident, Annex J of Sources and Effects of Ionizing Radiation, UNSCEAR 2000 Report to the General Assembly Vol. II
Ten Years after Chernobyl: what do we really know? (based on the proceedings of the IAEA/WHO/EC International Conference, Vienna, April 1996), International Atomic Energy Agency
Chernobyl: Assessment of Radiological and Health Impacts – 2002 Update of Chernobyl: Ten Years On, OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (2002).
Zbigniew Jaworowski, Lessons of Chernobyl with particular reference to thyroid cancer, Australasian Radiation Protection Society Newsletter No. 30 (April 2004). The same article appeared in Executive Intelligence Review (EIR), Volume 31, Number 18 (7 May 2004). An extended version of this paper was published as Radiation folly, Chapter 4 of Environment & Health: Myths & Realities, Edited by Kendra Okonski and Julian Morris, International Policy Press (a division of International Policy Network), June 2004 (ISBN 1905041004). See also Chernobyl Accident Appendix 2: Health Impacts
The chernobyl.info website www.chernobyl.info – out of date but some useful information
Chernobyl Forum information on IAEA website
Mikhail Balonov, The Chernobyl Forum: Major Findings and Recommendations, presented at the Public Information Materials Exchange meeting held in Vienna, Austria on 12-16 February 2006
GreenFacts webpage on Scientific Facts on the Chernobyl Nuclear Accident (www.greenfacts.org/en/chernobyl)
European Centre of Technological Safety’s Chernobyl website (www.tesec-int.org/Chernobyl) and its webpage on Sarcophagus and Decommissioning of the Chernobyl NPP
Chernobyl Legacy website (www.chernobyllegacy.com)
David Mosey, Looking Beyond the Operator, Nuclear Engineering International, 26 Nov 2014
Chernobyl 25th anniversary, Frequently Asked Questions, World Health Organization (23 April 2011)
[Environmental Consequences of the Chernobyl Accident and their Remediation: Twenty Years of Experience](https://www.iaea.org/publications/7382/environmental-consequences-of-the-chernobyl-accident-and-their-remediation-twenty-years-of-experience “Environmental Consequences of the Chernobyl Accident and their Remediation: Twenty Years of Experience, Report of the UN Chernobyl Forum Expert Group “Environment” (2006)”), Report of the UN Chernobyl Forum Expert Group “Environment”, STI/PUB/1239, International Atomic Energy Agency (2006)
Appendices
Chernobyl Accident – Appendix 1: Sequence of Events Chernobyl Accident – Appendix 2: Health Impacts
Related information
RBMK Reactors Early Soviet Reactors and EU Accession Ukraine Safety of Nuclear Power Reactors Decommissioning Nuclear Facilities Fukushima Daiichi Accident Nuclear Energy and Sustainable Development Ukraine: Russia-Ukraine War and Nuclear Energy
